Introduction
The transformation of China from a centrally planned economy to a market economy is one of the most important changes in the world economy in the last three decades. A key element of this process is the gradual privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the introduction of a corporate income tax system which raises revenue from both private and state owned …rms. While economic research has devoted a lot of attention to the privatization process, much less is known about the corporation tax in China. What makes corporate taxation in China particularly interesting is that the tax is levied on a wide range of companies including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collectively-owned enterprises, and private …rms that are funded by domestic or foreign shareholders. This feature of the corporation tax system in China gives us a unique opportunity to shed light on the role of …rm ownership for the impact of corporate taxes on economic behavior.
During the process of economic transformation, China has implemented a series of tax reforms, including the most recent 2008 corporate tax reform which introduced uniform taxation of corporate income for all Chinese …rms. Before 2008, a dual system was in place which treated domestic and foreign owned …rms di¤erently. The corporate tax rate for domestic …rms was considerably higher than that for foreign owned …rms. Moreover, there was a tax base di¤erence which limits the amount of wages per worker that could be deducted from the corporate tax base. The limit was only applied to domestic …rms while foreign owned …rms could deduct the entire wage cost. As a prelude to the 2008 reform, the wage deduction ceiling for domestic …rms was raised signi…cantly in 2006. Subsequently, the corporate tax rate for domestic …rm was reduced to the level of the corporate tax rate applied to foreign …rms in 2008. The 2006 base reform and the 2008 rate reform are in the focus in this paper. 1 The 2006 and 2008 corporate tax reform in China provides a unique opportunity to investigate how …rms of di¤erent ownership types react to changes in the tax system. This issue bears important policy implication because governments often use corporation tax policies not just to raise revenue but also to encourage business investment and growth, while many countries -particularly those in the developing world -operate some form of mixed economy consisting …rms of di¤erent ownership types. In our analysis, we distinguish …ve types of …rms in the Chinese economy. First, there are the traditional state-owned companies (SOEs), typically owned by the provincial or central government. Second, there are the so called collectively-owned enterprises (COEs). These …rms are usually jointly owned by local governments and municipalities and other public institutions.
2 They are also publicly owned …rms but the jurisdictions owning them do not directly receive the taxes they pay, as will be explained further below. The third group consists of domestic private …rms owned by Chinese citizens or private-sector investors. The …rst three groups are all funded with domestic capital and thus considered domestic-owned …rms. Foreign-owned …rms, usually subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies, constitute the fourth group. The last group consists of …rms owned by parent companies or individuals in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. These companies are often indirectly owned by mainland Chinese investors, for whom Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are preferred o¤shore investment locations. In other words, it was common for Chinese investors to move capital o¤shore and then bring it back to China disguised as foreign investment. Preferential tax treatment for FDI was a potential reason for this 'round tripping'of investment. 3 The last two groups are funded with foreign capital and thus foreign-funded …rms.
To guide our empirical analysis we …rst develop a simple model of …rm behaviour in response to corporation tax, emphasizing the role of ownership. In the model wages are determined by bargaining between workers and the owners of the …rm. Workers di¤er in their skill levels, and each skill type is represented by a skill-speci…c worker representation (trade union). After wages have been determined …rm owners set the level of investment and the …nancial structure of the …rm.
The objective function of the …rm owner depends on who the owner is. While it is standard to assume that private …rms perceive taxes as costs and maximize after-tax pro…ts, de…ning the objective function of …rms owned by the government is less straightforward. The existing literature on the taxation of state-owned companies o¤ers di¤erent and partly opposing views about why these companies are taxed at all and how taxes a¤ect their behaviour. Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) argue that SOEs di¤er from private companies in that their activities are not distorted by taxation. If SOEs act in the interest of their owner, i.e. the government, they will not perceive taxes as costs. 4 This in turn implies that the 2 There are four sub-national levels in the administrative structure in China: provincial, prefectural, county and township. There is also an informal level of village government below township. 3 In additional to tax advantages, di¤erences in the property rights protection and exchange control between HMT and mainland China are other important factors for round-tripping investment. Some early studies estimated that round-tripping accounted for nearly a quarter of foreign in ‡ows to China in 1992 (Harrold and Lall, 1993; Lardy, 1995) , and the extent of round tripping may have increased since then (World Bank, 2002) . 4 We would expect SOEs to be least likely to perceive taxes as costs because these …rms are owned by the central government. The central government collects the corporate tax in China and keeps 60 per cent of the revenue while the rest is transferred to the provincial budget. A truky enevolent government should perceive the entire tax revenue as equivalent to a pro…t distribution. If the central government is only interested in its own revenue and neglects that of the provinces it should still be the case that SOEs which act in the interest of their owner perceive only 40 per cent of the tax payments as costs.
activities of SOEs are not distorted by taxation. In line with this approach some authors emphasize that many SOE managers in China have bureaucratic titles and are high-ranking members of the communist Party (Li, 1998) .
5 SOE managers typically receive evaluations for political promotions on a three-year cycle, and prior research suggests that such political promotions are e¤ective incentives for SOE managers to act in the interest of the government (Bradshaw, Liao and Ma, 2012) . According to this view, because such evaluations are done by bureaucrats, SOE managers are more likely to focus on objectives that best serve those of the bureaucrats, i.e. the government, and should not perceive taxes as an ultimate cost. This 'neutrality view'of SOEs is challenged by Cui (2012) , who argues that the Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) view of SOEs should imply that SOEs are exempt from taxation. However, most countries including China do tax SOEs. Cui (2012) then suggests that SOEs are taxed because there is an agency problem between the government and the managers of SOEs. According to Cui, taxes are an e¢ cient way of extracting money from SOEs. From this perspective we should expect SOEs to react to taxation as private …rms do. In our theoretical analysis these two contradicting views of how SOEs react to taxes are included as special cases. Clearly, which of these views is more appropriate is ultimately an empirical question. To the best of our knowledge the present paper is the …rst to address this issue from an empirical perspective.
The identifying variation that allows us to examine the link between …rm ownership and the e¤ect of corporate taxes is provided by the two tax reforms in 2006 and 2008. These reforms change the taxation of all domestic …rms including SOEs, COEs, and private …rms but not the taxation of foreign …rms. We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erence (D-in-D) estimation approach to identify the causal e¤ect of tax changes. We focus on the following two aspects. Firstly, the wage deduction ceiling was uplifted for domestic …rms in 2006. Our theoretical analysis predicts that the increase in the wage deduction ceiling should lead to an increase in wages for all employees, not just for employees whose wages are above the deduction ceiling. The e¤ect of taxes on wages is increasing in the bargaining power of workers, as well as in the weight attributed to taxes as costs as well as in the number of workers with wages above the deduction ceiling in the …rm, i.e. the number of skilled workers. If taxes are not perceived as costs at all (that is, they are perceived as a perfect substitute for dividends), there should be no wage response to the increase in the deduction ceiling. The reason is that, in this case, tax cut does not increase the surplus produced by the …rm. At a more general level the wage change can be interpreted as re ‡ecting the incidence of the corporate tax on wages. The second aspect we study is the reduction of the tax rate for domestic …rms in 2008. In line with standard theory our model predicts that domestic …rms will react to the tax rate reduction by increasing their investment and by reducing the extent of debt …nancing. At the same time this reform eliminated any tax incentives for Chinese shareholders to round trip investment through Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Therefore we would expect this type of investment to decline. Again, if …rms do not perceive taxes as costs they should not react to the tax changes.
In our empirical analysis we …nd that there is no signi…cant response of SOEs to tax changes. In contrast, we …nd strong and signi…cant responses of both COEs and private …rms. The empirical evidence is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model and is robust to a wide range of alternative speci…cations that control for other confounding factors. More speci…cally, there is no signi…cant response of wages in SOEs to the increase in the wage deduction ceiling but there is a sizable increase in the average annual wage per worker in both COEs and private …rms. The preferred estimation results suggest that the increase in the average wage per worker accounts for around 22 percent of total tax bene…ts in COEs and around 6 percent of the tax bene…ts in private …rms. The wage increase is signi…cantly larger in COEs. A possible explanation is that employees may have more bargaining power in COEs than in private …rms. This evidence is further supported by results in the heterogenous wage response analysis, as there is a stronger wage increase in COEs and private …rms with disproportionately high-skill workers and in those with a trade union.
Our …ndings for the 2008 decrease in the statutory corporate tax rate, which decreases the incentives to use debt as a tax shield, show a similar pattern. There is no signi…cant response of debt ratio in SOEs. In comparison, the debt ratio decreased signi…cantly in COEs and private …rms. On average, the marginal impact of the CIT rate on the debtasset ratio ranges between 0.03 in private …rms to 0.06 in COEs. We also …nd a strong and positive e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on investment undertaken by private …rms. The user cost elasticity is estimated to be around 1 for private investment in China and is consistent with results of existing studies for other countries. In addition, our …ndings suggest the presence of round-tripping investment under the pre-2008 dual tax system, which declines after the 2008 tax rate change that eliminated much of the tax incentives for round-tripping investment.
This paper is related to several strands of empirical literature on the e¤ect of corporation tax. Firstly, we contribute to studies on the e¤ects of corporation taxes on business investment.
6 Our paper also relates to the literature that focuses on the link between corporate 6 The modern literature on the impact of corporate taxation on investment and long-run capital formation income tax rates and corporate capital structure. 7 Thirdly, there is a growing literature on tax avoidance by multinational …rms. 8 We contribute to these three strands of literature by documenting a causal impact of corporate income taxes on …rm investment and capital structure in China, and by providing evidence on tax motivated investment round-tripping which can be considered as a form of tax avoidance using multinational corporate structures. Moreover, our paper relates to the literature on the incidence of the corporate income tax (CIT), both theoretical and empirical. The modern theory of corporate tax incidence begins with Harberger's (1962) general equilibrium model of a tax on capital in the corporate sector, which …nds that capital would fully bear the burden. The theoretical literature extends this basic formulation by introducing multiple sectors (e.g., (Shoven, 1976) ), moving to an open economy (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Bradford, 1978; Harberger, 1995) , and relaxing the assumptions of perfect competition (Davidson and Martin, 1985; Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni, 2012; Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch, 2013) , and homogenous factors (Diamond and Spinnewijn, 2011) . Our theoretical model allows the extent to which taxes are perceived as costs to di¤er across private and state owned …rms and we show that this may a¤ect the incidence of the corporate tax on wages.
The recent empirical literature on corporate tax incidence includes a number of studies which …nd that labor shares the burden of corporate income taxes, but results about the magnitude of the incidence e¤ects di¤er.
9 Our …ndings con…rm the view that there is a negative e¤ect of corporate income taxes on wages in non-SOEs, and that the e¤ects are heterogeneous across …rms with di¤erent skill compositions of the labor force. In particular, high and medium-skilled workers, who arguably extract higher rents in collective bargaining, seem to bear a larger share of the corporate tax burden in China. This result is consistent with …ndings in other studies using data from Germany, UK and United States. Our paper further contributes to the literature on state and private …rms by providing the …rst empirical begins with the pioneering work of Jorgenson (1963) . In simplest terms, corporate taxes lower the after-tax return from investment and reduce the amount of investment and the level of capital stock. Recent empirical studies that con…rm this negative e¤ect of corporation taxes on business investment include Cummins et al. (1994) , Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) , Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) , Edgerton (2010) , Yagan (2013) , Bond and Xing (2013) , and Zwick and Mahon (2014) .
comparison of their response to corporate taxation.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional background. In section three we develop a simple model of wage setting and investment in SOEs and derive testable hypotheses for the impact of tax changes on wages and other behavioural responses. In section 4 we present the data and discuss some summary statistics and stylized facts on SOEs in China. Section 5 and 6 include the empirical analysis for the 2006 and 2008 tax changes, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
Institutional Background
In this section we …rst provide an overview over the di¤erent types of …rm ownership in China. Next we brie ‡y discuss the privatization of SOEs in China during the opening up process and the implications for wage setting institutions. We then describe the current corporation tax system in China and how the recent tax reform brought di¤erential changes in the tax treatment of …rms with di¤erent ownership types. Domestically funded …rms also include COEs, which are owned either by employees of the …rm, a group of community members such as all the residents in an administrative jurisdiction, or by township and village governments. Following a "Rede…ning the Property Rights" reform launched by the government in the early 1990s, collective enterprises have come under closer control of the government as their assets became deemed to be owned by the state (unless otherwise …nanced by borrowing or self-funding). Unlike collective enterprises, private enterprises are owned by private individuals who hire workers for pro…t-making activities. They account for 96.9% of total domestic enterprises in China.
Ownership Structure of Chinese Firms
A …rm is de…ned as foreign owned if foreign …rms hold 25% or more of its equity shares. By de…nition, foreign-owned …rms include joint ventures between state-owned enterprises and foreign investors, as long as the foreign share is larger than 25%. Foreign-owned …rms are further classi…ed into two types: those owned by …rms in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT) which share a distinctive economic and political proximity with the mainland of China, and those owned by foreign …rms outside these three locations. In 2012, there were about 101,518 HMT …rms and 109,103 other foreign-owned …rms in China (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013).
Privatization and Wage Setting System in SOEs
Historically there was basically no labor market in China. All …rms were owned by the state, while output, jobs and total wage bill in the SOEs were set by the central plan. Within a given SOE, wages were determined according to a national system of grades, scales and seniority. Promotion and wage increases were based on age and experience within the work unit. Because priority was given to capital accumulation to encourage industrial development, wages were set at a very low level.
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A state-owned enterprise restructuring program was initiated in 1997 in order to tackle large and unsustainable …nancial losses of SOEs, marking the end of guaranteed employment and bene…ts for China's urban workers. The theme of the reform was to "grasp the large 13 Regarding the wage distribution within SOEs, there was dramatic wage compression which implied substantial subsidies to the least skilled workers. For example, workers were classi…ed into eight skills, and the ratio of the highest to the lowest wage was only 3.15. Such a compensation structure remained in the state sector well into the 1990s during the reform era in China (Gordon and Li, 1999) . A ‡oating total wage system was implemented in 1984 to replace the centrally …xed total wage quota system as part of a larger initiative to separate company ownership and management by introducing a contract responsibility system. The ‡oating wage system linked the total wage bill and pro…t remittances to the government of an enterprise to its economic performance in the previous three years. While the pay scale was still primarily based on pay rank and occupation, wage payments for individual workers became composed of two parts: a …xed basic pay and a ‡oating bonus. The ‡oating system related the enterprise's total wage bill to its pro…tability, allowing …rms to retain part of their pro…ts for workers'bonus and the total wage bill. and release the small": most small and unproductive SOEs were privatized or sold o¤ at the municipal and county level, while some of the larger SOEs were restructured through mergers, incorporation, and public listing through initial public o¤erings (Cao, Qian and Weingast, 1999) . As part of this initiative, the number of SOEs was reduced by 74% while around 28 million SOE workers were made redundant, accounting for half of the SOE workforce (Xia et al., 2013) .
A key goal of the SOE reform was to transform the remaining SOEs into modern marketoriented enterprises. The state also gave more autonomy to the managers of the incorporated SOEs. The reform and restructuring of SOEs was followed by soaring wages and bonuses in the SOE sector. Even in the period of mass retrenchment, there was a pay rise for those SOE workers who remained employed (see, for example, Appleton, Song and Xia (2005) and Bai, Lu and Tao (2006) ). To address this issue, the SASAC was established in June of 2003 to oversee all SOEs in China. A labor contract system was introduced to all central SOEs, by which, in each year, the SASAC negotiates with each of the SOEs over the base amount of wages and salaries for next year.
14 Two general principles were to guide wage increases in SOEs: the growth rate of total wages should be lower than the growth rate of pro…tability, and the growth rate of the average wage should be lower that of productivity. The total amount of wages and salaries in a SOE is also tied to its pro…tability, depending on the extent to which the SOE meets its key performance indicators including sales and pro…t targets. The determination of the wage structure remains a matter of decision making within the SOE sector.
Evolution of Corporation Tax in China
The current corporate tax system in China, which is e¤ective since January 1, 2008, sets the same basic tax rules for all companies in China. The current statutory tax rate is 25%, and all enterprises are treated equally in regard of income tax including tax preferential treatments.
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Prior to the uniform corporate tax system, domestic and foreign enterprises were taxed under the same headline rate of 33%. The e¤ective tax rate for foreign enterprises, however, was much lower, due to a combination of reduced statutory tax rates, extended tax holidays, and generous tax deductions as listed in column (3) of Table 1 . The policy justi…cation which was given for the preferential tax treatment was to attract foreign direct investment with a low tax burden.
Having remained in place for about 30 years, this preferential tax treatment for foreignfunded companies was gradually removed by the 2006 base reform and the more comprehensive 2008 rate reform. However, in the …rst years after 2008 the e¤ective taxation for foreign …rms remained unchanged because the tax privileges were phased out gradually, as will be explained in greater detail below.
Corporation income tax (CIT) is the second largest source of tax revenue in China, representing 16.1% of total government revenue in 2011 (see Figure A.1) . 16 Over the last decade CIT revenue has tended to grow much faster than national income. For example, CIT revenue increased at an average annual rate of 24.5% during 2003-2011. CIT revenue was equal to 2% of GDP in 2003 and amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 2011. The central government sets the legislation governing taxation including corporate income taxation. Local authorities have no autonomy in the area of taxation (Wang and Herd, 2013) . China has a dual system of tax administration and collection. The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and its local o¢ ces collect corporation taxes of central SOEs, and the provincial governments have their own institutions to collect corporation tax revenues from regional SOEs, COEs and private …rms. 17 Tax revenues collected at the sub-national level are then transferred to the central government and the total revenue of corporation tax is shared between the central and local governments following a 60%-40% split. 18 As discussed in Wang and Herd (2013) , tax sharing between government levels follows the criterion of individual proportionality so that the revenue share of each sub-central government is strictly related to tax revenue generated on its own territory. 
Phase 1: Elimination of Regional Tax Refund to SOEs in 2002
Another tax change that was relevant for our empirical analysis is the elimination of regional tax refund in 2002, a period during which many domestic enterprises were also taxed at a 16 In comparison, corporate tax revenue has remained relatively stable and accounts for approximately 10% of annual tax revenue in the UK over the last decade. 17 For corporate taxes, the entire pro…t of a company operating across several provinces is allocated to the province where the company has its headquater.
18 Each level of sub-national government then shares their corporate tax revenue with the lower-level government. In 2009, the share of corporate income tax allocated to sub-national governments is as follows: 37.8% to provincial, 31.1 to prefecture, 23% to county, and 8.1% to township government.
19 revenue sharing is governed be the three principles of risk sharing, unconditionally, and formula stability.Risk sharing implies that the amount of revenue allocated to the sub-central level is strictly related to the total tax intake. Un-conditionality implies that the sub-central government is free to use the allocated tax revenue. Formula stability implies that the revenue shares of the central and sub-central governments are pre-determined and cannot be changed during the period of the agreement (Wang and Herd, 2013). low rate similar to their foreign counterparts. Before 2000, it was common for regional governments in China to engage in tax competition to boost investment and employment by giving above-scale domestic …rms part of their tax receipts collected. The rate of tax refund was usually 18%, which aligned the e¤ective tax rate for domestic …rms to be the same as the 15 percent rate for foreign funded …rms. This was to level the playing …eld between major domestic and foreign …rms at the expense of tax revenues. Starting from 2000, such practice was explicitly prohibited by the central government, and the corporation tax revenue collection authority was changed from regional administration of taxes to state administration of taxes. By 2002, both listed and unlisted domestic …rms no longer received preferential tax treatment in the form of partial tax refunds. Accounting for these changes in the tax reform, the sample period that we consider in the empirical analysis runs from 2003 to 2009.
Phase 2: Increase in the Wage Deduction Ceiling in 2006
Prior to the 2008 tax reform, domestic …rms could only deduct wage bills up to a limit. The wage deduction limit was 800 RMB per month for each worker between January 1, 1999 and June 30, 2006, and was doubled to 1,600 RMB from July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2008 Employee bene…ts including union fees, training fees and social security contributions were deductible up to a maximum of 2%, 14% and 1.5% of the total wage. In contrast, foreignfunded enterprises could fully deduct wages and employee bene…ts from the corporate tax base. The deduction limit for domestic enterprises was completely abolished since January 1, 2008 so that wage expenses became fully deductible in all …rms regardless of their ownership type. Details of these two reforms are also summarized in column (4) of Table 1 .
Phase 3: Uni…cation of Enterprise Income Tax in 2008
The Enterprise Income Tax Law was enacted in March 16, 2007 and took e¤ect beginning January 1, 2008 for all …rms in China. Under the new tax law, companies of all ownership types are subject to a uniform income tax rate of 25%. In particular, there is a signi…cant reduction in the statutory tax rate for domestic enterprises from 33% to 25%.
The new tax law provides a …ve-year transition period for foreign-funded enterprises. The transition period starts from the date of enactment for those …rms established before March 16, 2007, which were entitled to the lower income tax rate under the old system. The corporate income tax rate of these enterprises will gradually increase to 18%, 20%, 22%, 24%, and 25% within the next …ve years of the transition period. For those enterprises which were enjoying tax holidays in the form of two-year tax exemptions, such tax holidays continued to be e¤ective. For those enterprises which were entitled to the tax holiday but had not yet started claiming the tax holidays because of losses, such tax holidays were deemed to commence in 2008. Summarizing, for new or loss-making foreign enterprises, the two-year tax holiday starts immediately in 2008 instead of starting in the …rst year when the foreign enterprise becomes pro…table. Because of the transition period, there is no immediate tax change for most foreign enterprises following the introduction of the 2008 uniform tax law.
Theoretical Framework
What are the economic e¤ects we should expect from the changes in the corporate tax system in China? In this section we develop a stylized model of …rm behavior where wage setting as well as employment and investment decisions are the result of bargaining between di¤erent groups of employees and …rm owners. Following Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) , we assume that …rm owners di¤er in the degree to which they see corporate income taxes as costs, depending on whether or not the owner, which may be the government, fully or partly receives the tax revenue generated by the …rm.
The Model
Consider a …rm with two types of workers, low skilled and high skilled. Firm i's pro…t before taxes is given by
2), K i and r i denote wages, employment levels, the …rm's capital and the non-tax cost of capital, respectively; r i is given by
where 0 d i 1 is the share of debt …nancing of the …rm's capital, r d i is the interest on debt, r e i is the minimum rate of return required by the …rm's equity investors, and i (d i ) is a nontax cost of debt …nancing, which may be interpreted, for instance, as representing agency costs depending on the capital structure of a …rm. We assume
This is a standard way of modelling the nontax costs and bene…ts of changes in the capital structure.
Denote the ceiling for wage deductions per worker by w and assume that the ceiling is binding for workers of type 2 (the high skilled) but not for workers of type 1, i.e. w 1 i < w < w 2 i . Since interest payment on debt is deductible from the pro…t tax base, the amount of corporate income tax the …rm has to pay is given by
where t is the statutory tax rate and is a parameter representing depreciation deductions.
Assume further that …rm owner j attributes a weight to tax payments denoted by j , with j 2 [0; 1]. For instance, a private …rm owner will usually set a weight = 1, so that taxes would be considered as any other type of cost. In contrast, if the …rm is owned by a government which receives the tax payment as income, the government should be indi¤erent between a pro…t distribution and a corporate income tax payment. In this case, j = 0. There could also be intermediate cases. For instance, in many federal states corporate income tax revenue is shared between regional or local governments and the central government. In China, the sharing ratio of corporate tax revenue is 60% versus 40% between the central and provincial government, as explained in section 2.3. 22 Under this sharing scheme, if the local government receives a share s of the corporate income tax revenue generated by a …rm it owns, the cost weight attributed to taxes should be j = 1 s. Incorporating all these possible scenarios, the objective function of a …rm owner of type j owning …rm i is given by
Firm Behavior and Wage Setting
We model …rm behavior and wage setting as follows. Decisions about employment, …nancing, investment and wages are taken in two stages. At stage 1 workers and …rms bargain over wages and employment. At stage 2 the …rm sets its …nancial structure d i and the capital stock K i to maximize pro…ts. We start by considering stage 2. The …rm maximizes (1) over d i and K i . The …rst order conditions are given by
(1 j t) 
is the cost of capital including taxes, given the …rm's optimal …nancing structure d i .
Consider next stage 1, where worker …rm bargaining takes place. The two groups of workers and the …rm owner simultaneously bargain over wages w k i and employment levels L k i , k = 1; 2. Reservation wages for workers are given by b k ; k = 1; 2. Workers maximize their rent, which is given by (w
, where p k i is the wage premium for workers of type k . The …rm owner's reservation pro…t is normalized to zero. The outcome of the bargaining process is given by
where
The variable k denotes relative bargaining power of the two groups of workers. The …rst order conditions for the solution of the bargaining problem can be rearranged to yield the following results for employment:
The ceiling for wage deductions leads to a distortion of high skilled (type 2) employment, as one might expect.
For the two wage premia we get:
is the surplus after taxes generated by the …rm. Equations (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) implicitly de…ne the variables
i as functions of the tax rate t, the deduction ceiling w, the weight that …rm owner j attributes to tax payments j , and of other parameters in the model.
Our empirical analysis focuses on (i) the impact of the change in the deduction ceiling w on wages in the 2006 reform, and (ii) the impact of the 2008 change in the corporate tax rate on investment and leverage. Consider …rst the change in the deduction ceiling. Di¤erentiating (7) and (8) and using equations (2), (3), (5),(6) yields:
The rents accruing to both groups of workers increase if the wage deduction ceiling increases. This implies that, for given levels of employment, both wages increase if w increases. This e¤ect is stronger, the higher the bargaining power of the workers, the more tax payments are perceived as costs and the larger the number of type 2 workers for whom the deduction ceiling will be binding. We may thus state the following:
Result 1: If 1 ; 2 ; j > 0 wages of all workers will increase in response to an increase in the deduction ceiling, given the levels of L k i and K i . The e¤ect is increasing in the bargaining power of the skill group, the weight attributed to tax costs as well as the number of skilled workers in the …rm.
What is the impact of a tax rate change on investment and debt …nancing? Note that equation (2) implicitly de…nes
is standard in the literature and re ‡ects that accelerated tax depreciation may lead to the taxation paradox, where higher tax rates increase investment because they increase the value of depreciation allowances. Most tax systems, however, include more limited depreciation allowances so that higher taxes reduce investment. These …ndings are summarised as ((1 d i ) > 0, and for given levels of employment, an increase (decrease) in the corporate tax rate reduces (increases) investment K i , and
Result 3: If j > 0, an increase (decrease) in the corporate tax rate increases (reduces) debt …nancing d i .
Implications for the Empirical Analysis
What do results 1-3 imply for our empirical analysis? Consider …rst result 1, which is related to the 2006 reform. The model predicts that the reaction of wages to changes in the deduction ceiling depends on three factors: (1) the distribution of bargaining power in the wage setting process, (2) the weight owners/managers attribute to taxes as costs, and (3) the share of workers with wages above the deduction ceiling. Our data does include some information on di¤erences in average skill and wage levels across …rms but relative worker bargaining power and the weights attributed to taxes as costs are unobservable.
Our model nevertheless o¤ers some guidance for the empirical analysis. Firstly, it highlights the di¤erence in views between Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) and Cui (2012) . Corporate tax revenue in China …rst goes to the central government. If there are …rms that do not perceive taxes as costs they are more likely to be those owned by the central government (the SOEs and particularly the central SOEs) rather than the COEs since the latter are owned by local governments. If this is the case, wage increase after the 2006 reform should be stronger in COEs than in SOEs. If we observe no such di¤erence and both types of …rms increase wages in response to the higher wage ceiling, this would support Cui (2012)'s claim that SOEs are run by managers who do perceive taxes paid to their owner, the central government, as a cost.
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The model also draws attention to the fact that di¤erent wage reactions may re ‡ect di¤erences in the distribution of bargaining power in wage negotiations. Here the di¤erence between state-owned (both SOE and COE) …rms, on the one hand, and private …rms on the other hand may play a role. Employees in state-owned …rms are more likely to have strong bargaining power than in private …rms because public owners may be less focused on pro…ts than private owners. In addition, domestic private …rms are often relatively small and have a less skilled workforce. One would expect that worker bargaining power plays a smaller role because workers can more easily be replaced.
What does our theoretical analysis have to say about the corporate tax changes that came into force in 2008? For the 2008 tax reform the reduction in the statutory tax rate for domestic …rms was the most important element. Equations (7) and (8) show that we should again observe a wage e¤ect in the …rms bene…ting from the tax cut.
24 But a change in the headline corporate tax rate also changes incentives for corporate investment and …nancing decisions. Results 2 and 3 predict that the decline in the corporate tax rate for domestic 23 An alternative explanation would be that managers of SOEs perceive the increase in the deduction ceiling as a political signal to raise wages. They might react to this signal irrespective of the …nancial incentives created by the reform. Yet another explanation would be that fairness norms require …rms to adjust wages. 24 Unfortunately our data only include the wage variable up to 2007 so we are unable to test empirically the wage response following the 2008 reform. …rms will increase investment and reduce debt …nancing in these …rms, provided that the owners perceive taxes as costs. We bring these predictions to empirical tests in the following sections.
Data and Summary Statistics

Data set
We use the …rm-level Annual Survey of Industrial Firms dataset conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. This dataset contains detailed accounting and ownership information on all SOEs in China and all the non-SOEs with annual sales over RMB 5 million (approx. £ 500,000). It covers …rms in 41 broad industry sectors including mining, manufacturing, and electricity and utility. In 2007, …rms in the data account for 47.4% of total industrial value-added and 26.8% of total urban employment in China.
We take the following steps to create a clean sample for the analysis. We …rst exclude …rms in the mining, electricity and utility sector and use …rms in the 31 two-digit industry sectors of manufacturing, wholesale and retailing. We exclude all …rms with zero or negative sales, outputs, total assets, …xed assets, employment, wages, and total paid-in capital. We further exclude …rms with any observations taking negative values in: total asset minus net …xed asset, accumulated depreciation minus current-year depreciation, and total paidin capital minus paid-in capital from each type of investors. We check the consistency of …rm identi…er and exclude all …rms reporting di¤erent 2-digit industry sector and year of incorporation in the sample period. In addition, we exclude observations with fewer than 10 employees since these …rms are less likely to use credible accounting system. To minimize the in ‡uence of outliers on the regression analysis, we winsorize the key variables including wage bill, employment and annual wage bill per worker at the top and bottom 1 percentile of its distribution in each year.
We use the full sample dataset following the above data cleaning procedure to present some stylized facts about SOEs. We use a smaller, unbalanced dataset which includes …rms that exist in the sample at least two years before and one year after the relevant policy reform in the regression analysis. Both datasets range between 2003 and 2009 to minimize the potential impact of partial tax refunds to domestic …rms in identifying the tax e¤ect of interest. All monetary variables are de ‡ated to 2006 prices.
Key variables
To understand the e¤ect of the 2006 policy reform on wages, we compute the annual average company wage as costs of employees divided by the total number of employees. 25 We focus on two outcome variables to understand the impact of corporation tax on the investment and …nancial decisions of …rms. Speci…cally, we use the debt-asset ratio to measure the extent of …rm borrowing, which is de…ned as total debt relative to total assets for each …rm-year observation. As in most other countries, …rms in China can deduct interest expenses from the corporate tax base, but not equity returns. We use the log of total …xed assets to measure the extent of investment. In 2004, China conducted its …rst nationwide economic census. As a result, the 2004 data includes additional important information on the number of workers by education levels (including those with postgraduate, college graduate, associate degree, high school diploma, and below high school education, respectively). We use this information to distinguish between enterprises that mainly employ low-skilled workers and those that mainly employ high-skilled workers. In addition, the 2004 data reports whether the enterprise has an union and the corresponding number of workers as union members.
Following discussions in section 2.1, we identify a company's ownership type based on the registration type and the relative amount of paid-in capital. Every Chinese …rm is registered as a domestic enterprise in the form of SOE, COE, or private enterprise, or as a foreignfunded enterprise in the form of a HMT enterprise or other foreign investment enterprise (FIE).
We complement ownership registration with additional information on the amount of paid-in capital in each …rm. Speci…cally, we identify the major shareholder type of a …rm by comparing the amount of total paid-in capital with that of each paid-in capital type including state capital, collective capital, legal-person capital, individual capital, HMT capital and foreign capital. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures requires the proportion of the capital contributed by the foreign investor(s) to be at least 25% of the equity share in the joint ventures are HMT/foreign venturers. Following this requirement, we identify an enterprise as HMT/foreign if the proportion of foreign paid-in capital is more than 25% of the total paid-in capital, or the largest share of the total paid-in capital if none of the other types of investors have a majority share. Following this approach, we are also able to identify …rms that changed ownership during the sample period, which represents quite a small share of the full sample as shown in Figure 1 reports the key sample characteristics by ownership type between 2009. Panel (a) shows that the number of …rms has increased substantially over the last decade. This is mainly because more non-SOEs entered the sample by meeting the nominal 5 million RMB criterion as a result of rapid expansion of the economy. The rapid expansion in the domestic private sector outweighs the decrease in the number of …rms in the state sector, suggesting that the increase in the number of private companies is not driven by privatization of SOEs. Between 2003 and 2009, the share of SOEs decreased from 20 percent to less than 2 percent, and the share of COEs decreased from 19 percent to around 3 percent. In contrast, the share of domestic privately owned …rms increased from 41 to 78 percent, while the share of foreign-funded …rms (including HMTs) remains stable at around 18%. Note that there is a sharp increase in the number of private domestic …rms in 2005, which is documented and discussed in other studies that use the same database for analysis.
26 This is because a more comprehensive Industrial Census was conducted in 2004 and identi…ed a large number of …rms that were previously left out of the annual survey due to imperfect business registry. As a result, more non-SOEs has been included in the annual survey since then.
Large operation scale
Panels (b)-(d) of …gure 1 show that on average, SOEs operate on a much larger scale than …rms of other ownership types as measured by total assets, total industrial sales, and the number of employment. For example, the average of total assets in SOEs is 16 times larger than in private …rms and 5 times larger than in foreign …rms in 2009. On average, an SOE has 6.5 times more sales and employs 3 times more workers than a private …rm, and has 2.3 times more sales and employs 1.6 times more workers than a foreign …rm. As a consequence, total assets per worker in an average SOE is 5.4 times more than in a private …rm and 3.1 times more than in a foreign …rm. SOEs also demonstrate strong growth over the sample period, partly due to the fact that the state has allocated unrivaled amounts of resources to maintain the economic dominance of a relatively small number of SOEs. For example, on average total real assets per worker in SOEs more than doubled from 322.89 to 729.8 million RMB during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , while the concurrent increase in total assets per worker in private and foreign …rms is 1.60 and 1.2 times, respectively.
Low pro…tability and tax payment
There is sharp contrast between the large operation scale with the small number of pro…table SOEs in panel (a) of …gure 2. The share of pro…table SOEs, measured by the number of SOEs with positive operating pro…ts is around 45% in 2003 and is much lower than the 80% of pro…table …rms in the private sector and 70% of pro…table foreign-funded …rms. While the gap has been closing due to the continuous increase in the number of pro…table SOEs, the share of pro…table SOEs is still the lowest toward the end of the sample period. In other words, a substantial percentage of SOEs run at a loss, implying that they are either subsidized by the government or by the state-owned banking system.
Despite the large size of SOEs, they are on average slightly less pro…table. Focusing on the pro…table …rms, it is interesting to note in panel (c) that foreign funded …rms and HMTs are slightly more pro…table than their domestic counterparts. Within the domestic group the pro…tability of private …rms and COEs is closely related and remains slightly higher than that of SOEs by the end of 2009.
Finally, panel (d) of …gure 2 compares the mean average tax rate (ATR)-calculated as the corporate income tax payment relative to earnings before tax (EBT)-across ownership types. Three observations are worth noting. First, the mean ATR is considerably lower than the corresponding statutory rate across all ownership types, re ‡ecting the generosity of various tax deductions and credits that are available to Chinese …rms. For example, the pre-2008 statutory tax rate for domestic …rms was 33 percent and is almost twice their mean ATR. Second, there are systematic di¤erences in the average ATR across di¤erent ownership types. To check the relation between total corporation tax payments and earnings before taxes, we regress the total corporation tax paid in …rm i at year t (CT it ) against the …rm-level operating pro…t (Pr of it it ) by ownership types, while controlling for depreciation, and interest expenses (IntExp it ) :
where i and t are a full set of …rm and year …xed e¤ects. In equation (11), 1 is a measure of the average tax rate by ownership, while 2 and 3 captures the overall e¤ect of depreciation allowances and interest expenses on total tax payment, respectively. Table 2 summarizes the …ndings. The estimated average tax rate b 1 is positive and highly signi…cant in all ownership types, and is considerably higher in SOEs and private …rms.
Compared to domestic …rms, the mean ATR for foreign-funded …rms is signi…cantly lower due to the pre-2008 preferential tax treatment for foreign investment. The mean ATR for domestic and foreign …rms also demonstrate di¤erent trends over time, with the former continuing to decrease toward to the end of the time period. In contrast, while remaining low in levels, the mean ATR for foreign-funded …rms started to increase slightly from 2008. As of 2009, the mean ATR across the di¤erent ownership types started to converge in levels, at least among …rms with positive book pro…ts.
Wage Responses to the 2006 Reform
Estimation Approach
Following the theoretical considerations in Section 2, we estimate an empirical model of the following form log w it = 0 + 1 SOE i + 2 SOE i P ost 2006;t + 3 COE i + 4 COE i P ost 2006;t (12)
where w it represents the annual average company wage for …rm i at time t. Since the distribution of w i is considerably skewed, we employ a logarithmic transformation of the level of average wage rate as the dependent variable. The variables SOE i /COE i /private i is a dummy indicator of ownership type which takes value of 1 if the considered …rm is a domestic SOE/COE/private …rm and 0 otherwise, respectively. Note that the excluded ownership type is foreign-funded …rms including HMTs and other FIEs. The variable P ost 2006;t is a dummy indicator that takes a value of 1 from 2006 onwards. The key variables of interest are the three interaction terms between the ownership indicators SOE i /COE i /private i and the postreform indicator P ost 2006;t . If workers share part of the higher after-tax pro…t due to more generous tax deductions, we would expect a positive coe¢ cient for each of the interaction term having controlled for a full set of …rm …xed e¤ects i and year …xed e¤ects t . More importantly, following Result 1 in the theoretical section, we expect the coe¢ cients of the three interaction terms ( 2 , 4 and 6 ) to be potentially di¤erent. Some of the regression speci…cations further control for a set of time-varying …rm characteristics included in the vector X it . Precisely, we control for the size of the …rm by including the enterprise's total sales, sales growth rate, and capital stock proxied by total asset. In some of the speci…cations we also control for employment which may be a¤ected by the change in the tax base. We control for …rm age to acknowledge that young …rms entering a market may face di¤erent wage costs. In addition, to better control for growth at the industry level, we include a full set of industry-speci…c time trends that capture industry-level technological change over and above the common macroeconomic trends. Finally, it depicts the error term. Figure 3 shows the annual average company wage across the di¤erent ownership types around the 2006 policy change. There is a discernible wage premium in foreign-funded …rms, while the average wage payment per worker continues to increase for all ownership types between 2004 and 2007. While changes in the average company wage in the domestic and foreign …rms tracks one another closely before the reform, there is a clear divergence after 2006 driven by a notable increase in the wage payment by SOEs and COEs. The increase in the wage payment in domestic private …rms is less signi…cant and continues to move similarly to the average wage payment in foreign-funded …rms after the reform. These patterns suggest that the 2006 increase in the wage deduction threshold may have some positive impact on workers'wage in domestic …rms and particularly, in SOEs and COEs. The regression analysis in the next section aims to disentangle the causal e¤ect of tax changes on wages from the e¤ects of various potential confounding factors. Table 3 presents regression results using a set of speci…cations based on equation (12) and augmented in various ways as described below. All regressions include a full set of …rm and year …xed e¤ects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the …rm level are shown in brackets below the coe¢ cient estimates.
Graphical Evidence
Basic Results
The regression in column (1) follows the baseline speci…cation in equation (12) without including any additional control variables. On average, domestic …rms pay a lower wage compared to their foreign-funded peers as indicated by the negative coe¢ cients on the SOE, COE and private dummy indicators. The wage gap between SOEs and foreign-funded …rms is statistically insigni…cant, though. The estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term SOE P ost 2006 is positive and marginally signi…cant at the 10% level while the estimated coe¢ cients of the other two interaction terms COE P ost 2006 and private P ost 2006 are positive and highly signi…cant at the 1% level.
Quantitatively, the strong e¤ect of changes in the tax base on annual average company wages in domestic COEs and private …rms is robust to excluding observations in 2006 and using 2007 as the post-reform year in column (2), which allows for some adjustment lags in the wage setting process, and to adding …rm-level control variables of log sales in column (3), employment in column (4) and sales growth rate and log …xed assets in column (5). The e¤ect of tax on annual company wage in SOEs becomes insigni…cant once controlling for …rm size proxied by log sales. Column (6) further includes …rm age and sector-speci…c time trend as additional controls. Column (7) follows the same speci…cation in column (6) using a smaller sample with no companies switching ownership types. The basic …ndings remain quantitatively unchanged.
The di¤erences across speci…cations can be interpreted in the light of the approach suggested by Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2012) . Without including any controls, the identi…ed tax e¤ect on wages in speci…cations (1) and (2) may be seen as the total incidence of corporate income taxes including the e¤ect of taxes on wages through the scale of production and investment. In comparison, speci…cations that control for the scale of production and investment would identify the direct incidence of corporate income taxes through the collective bargaining channel. Note that, as laid out in the theoretical discussion, workers and …rm owners can bargain over both wages and employment. To check whether the wage response is entirely driven by bargaining over employment, we compare the identi…ed tax e¤ects in speci…cations (3) and (4). The size of the wage response decreases slightly when controlling for employment, but nevertheless remains positive and highly signi…cant for COEs and private domestic …rms.
Three observations are worth noting in Table 3 . First, there is no signi…cant wage increase in SOEs in response to the 2006 tax base reform, as indicated by the insigni…cant estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction term SOE P ost 2006 in speci…cations (3)-(6). We further examine whether wages responded di¤erently in wholly-owned SOEs and majority-owned SOEs and …nd that there is no signi…cant tax e¤ect on wages in either SOE type.
Second, both COEs and private …rms responded to the 2006 base reform by increasing their average annual wage. The economic magnitude of the wage increase is rather sizable. The wage increase amounts to around 4.7 percent in COEs and 1.3 percent in private …rms, and the size of the wage increase in COEs is signi…cantly larger than that in private …rms. Given that the average real wage per worker is around 14,534 RMB, this translates to an increase of the annual wage in COEs of about 683 RMB, compared to a 188 RMB increase in private …rms. The value of the increase in the wage deduction is around 3,168 RMB per year.
27 Therefore, the increase in the average wage per worker translates to 22% of total tax bene…ts in COEs and 7% in private …rms. Note that this is a lower bound of the tax bene…ts shared by workers because …rstly, the deduction ceiling may not be binding for all workers, and secondly, …rms with losses are included in the regression. When we exclude loss-making …rms, the estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction terms COE P ost 2006 increases slightly to 0:064 and remains unchanged for private …rms. Given that the average wage per worker is 15,040 RMB for pro…table …rms, the results suggest that the increase in the average wage per worker amounts to 30% of total tax bene…ts in pro…table COEs. 28 Note also that the identi…ed wage response corresponds to the direct impact of the corporation tax, which equals to a direct incidence of 30 cents in COEs, and 7 cents in private …rms. The magnitude of this e¤ect is slightly smaller than the wage incidence e¤ect of 49 cents found in Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2012) and of 46 cents found in Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2013) . These studies both consider the impact of tax rate changes. 29 One potential explanation for the di¤erence in results could be that the change in the cost deduction ceiling may be less salient compared to changes in tax rates. Third, the wage increase in COEs is signi…cantly larger than in private …rms, suggesting that on average, workers in the COEs reaped a larger share of bene…ts brought by the 2006 policy reform. This result may re ‡ect that workers in COEs are sometimes also partial owners of the company or that they might have greater bargaining power than workers in private …rms. Table 4 presents some evidence on heterogenous wage responses to the 2006 increase in the wage deduction threshold, which can be accounted for by di¤erences in the skill composition of employment and the presence of labor unions. Speci…cally, regressions in columns (1)- (2) separately examines the wage response in 'low-skill'and 'high-skill'…rms. 30 Comparing regression results in column (1) and (2), there are asymmetric wage responses across the di¤erent ownership and labor skill types. In particular, the signi…cant wage increase after the 2006 policy change mainly occurred in COEs and private …rms with a large share of highskill workers. Such heterogenous wage responses by labor skill composition is consistent with our theoretical discussion in Section 2, where we show that the tax e¤ect increases with the number of high-skilled workers because for these workers the deduction ceiling is more likely to be binding. In addition, high skilled workers may have more bargaining power.
Heterogeneous Wage Responses
To explore the role of trade unions, the regressions in column (3) and (4) separately examine the wage response in …rms with and without unions. The presence of a union suggests a stronger bargaining power of the workers. Results in column (3) and (4) suggest that the signi…cant wage increase after the 2006 policy change mainly occurred in COEs and private …rms with a trade union, which is again consistent with the prediction of result 1 in per worker below the wage deduction ceiling.
29 To be precise, Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2012) consider changes in corporate tax payments at the …rm level, where tax rate changes play a key role, while Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2013) look at statutory tax rate changes.
30 A …rm is de…ned as low skill if its share of low-skill workers is above the median share of low-skill workers in the full sample, where the share of low-skill workers is de…ned as the number of workers without any undergraduate education relative to the total number of workers in the …rm. Since information on the skill composition of workforce is only available for the year of 2004, the share of low-skill workers is time-invariant and non-missing for those observed in 2004. the theoretical section. This result is interesting because Chinese unions are widely seen as having little power and in ‡uence.
6 Firm Responses to the 2008 Tax Reform
Empirical Approach
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on two the other variables of interest, the amount of debt …nancing and investment. We do so using a similar D-in-D approach:
where y it represents the outcome variables and the P ost 2008;t dummy indicator takes value of 1 from year 2008 onwards. Given that the 2008 tax reform introduced an immediate and permanent decrease in the statutory tax rate of domestic …rms from 33 to 25 percent but had no immediate e¤ect on the statutory tax rate of foreign …rms, we continue to use FIEs as the control group in the D-in-D speci…cation.
As previously discussed, we focus on two outcome variables that aim to capture the e¤ect of taxes on debt …nancing (proxied by debt-asset ratio) and investment (proxied by total …xed assets). Given that a reduction in the statutory tax rate increases the after-tax price of borrowing, we expect that the 2008 tax reform would decrease the level of debt and hence the leverage ratio in domestic …rms. At the same time, a decrease in the statutory tax rate reduces the cost of capital for domestic …rms so that we expect an increase in the real capital stock in these …rms after the 2008 tax reform. Table 5 reports the regression results of the e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on debt ratio. Column (1) includes no additional control variables. Column (2) includes other determinants of capital structure including …rm size proxied by log of sales. Column (3) adds the pro…tability ratio to measure the availability of internal cash ‡ow, and column (4) further adds the sales growth rate to proxy future demand of …nancing. Column (5) further controls for di¤erential technology change at the industry level by including a full set of industry-speci…c time trend.
Results
The E¤ect of Tax Rate Changes on the Debt Ratio
31 Column (6) checks the robustness of the …ndings in column (5) to potential anticipation e¤ects by removing observations in 2007 when the legislation change was announced. Finally, column (7) includes the lagged debt ratio to control for persistence in the dependent variable, while column (8) follows the same speci…cation as in column (7) but use a smaller sample with no companies switching ownership types. The D-in-D approach appears to be valid given that there is no signi…cant response in HMT debt …nancing relative to other FIEs, which face similar tax changes brought by the 2008 tax reform. Focusing on the estimated coe¢ cients of the interaction terms, there are again di¤erential responses in the debt ratio across ownership types. While there is no signi…cant change in the debt ratios of SOEs, both COEs and private …rms responded to the decrease in the tax rate by reducing their leverage. The estimated response of the debt ratio to the tax change is highly signi…cant and robust to alternative speci…cations. The size of the tax e¤ect is slightly larger than …ndings in An (2012a) where the average debt-ratio increased by 0.003 in FIEs relative to their Chinese peers. His empirical approach uses domestic …rms as the control group and assumes that there is an immediate increase in the statutory tax rate for FIEs but not in domestic …rms. 32 Our results suggest a strong and positive link between corporate income tax rates and corporate debt levels. Using the results from the preferred speci…cation in column (7), cutting the corporate tax rate by eight percentage points (e.g. from 33 to 25%), reduces the debt asset ratio on average by around 1.4% in COEs and by around 0.7% in private …rms. 33 This translates to an elasticity of debt ratio with respect to the statutory tax rate of between 0.03 to 0.06, which is statistically signi…cant and lies toward the lower end of the existing estimates of the impact of CIT on corporate leverage in the literature. It is interesting to note that on average, domestic …rms rely more on debt than their foreign-funded counterparts. In particular, SOEs have a higher debt ratio than …rms of any other ownership type. This could be due to the fact that SOEs have advantages over non-SOEs in borrowing from banks at a lower cost (see, for example, Fang (2007), Lu et al. (2009), and Pan et al. (2009)) . Checking this in our data, we …nd that SOEs have the lowest interest rate among …rms of all …ve di¤erent ownership type. The interest rate for domestic …rms, which is calculated using interest expenses divided by total liability, is 31 Potentially we would also like to control for non-debt corporate tax shields including depreciation allowances and tax losses that are carried forward, which may reduce the value of the interest deduction. Unfortunately, we do not have depreciation allowances for the year of 2008 and 2009 in the data. 32 Contrary to An (2012a), we do not …nd a larger tax e¤ect on the debt ratio for HMTs than for other FIEs. 33 de Mooij (2011) reviews this literature and derives consensus estimates using a meta-analysis based on 267 estimates from 19 di¤erent studies. The consensus estimate. regarding the impact of the CIT rate on the debt-asset ratio, lies somewhere between 0.17 for narrow and 0.28 for broad measures of …nancial leverage. about 0.012 for SOEs, and about 0.025/0.032 for COEs and private …rms, respectively. The interest rate for foreign-funded …rms, is about 0.017 and 0.014 for HMT and other FIEs, respectively. A formal t-test of equal group means suggests that the interest rate for SOEs is signi…cantly lower than for other ownership types. The considerably lower interest rate may well represent an implicit government subsidy to the SOEs as all major banks in China are also owned by the state. Table 6 reports the regression results of the e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on total …xed assets. Similarly, column (1) includes no additional control variables. Column (2) includes other determinants of investment including the scale of production proxied by log of sales. Column (3) adds the size of employment to control for any substitution between capital and labor, and column (4) further adds the sales growth rate to proxy future demand of capital. Column (5) further controls for di¤erential technology change at the industry level by including a full set of industry-speci…c time trend.
The E¤ect of Tax Rate Changes on Investment
34 Column (6) checks the robustness of the …ndings in column (5) to any potential anticipation e¤ects by removing observations in 2007 when the legislation change was announced. Column (7) includes lagged …xed assets to control for persistence in the dependent variable, and column (8) follows the same speci…cation as in column (7) but use a smaller sample with no companies switching ownership types.
The regression results suggest that the 2008 tax reform had some positive and signi…cant e¤ects on total …xed asset in private …rms but not in SOEs or COEs. In other words, while private …rms continue to exhibit strong and positive response to the 2008 tax reform by increasing their …xed assets, there is no signi…cant response in COEs. There is a somewhat puzzling e¤ect in SOEs, as the estimated tax e¤ect on …xed assets is signi…cant and negative. A further check on the validity of the parallel trends assumption in …gure 4 suggests that, the parallel trends assumption for total …xed assets is largely satis…ed for all the non-SOE ownership types but is clearly violated for SOEs, as the …xed asset in SOEs started to decline as early as in 2005. The decreasing trend in total …xed asset is not observed for any other ownership.
Results in columns (7) and (8) suggest that on average, total …xed assets in private domestic …rms increased by about 12.6 percent as a result of the 2008 tax reform. This translates to an user cost elasticity of around 0.995, as the user cost of capital decreased from 0.079 to 0.069, or around 12%, given the decrease in the statutory tax rate. 35 The 34 Potentially we would also like to control for non-debt corporate tax shields including depreciation allowances and tax losses that are carried forward, which may reduce the value of the interest deduction. Unfortunately, we do not have depreciation allowances for the year of 2008 and 2009 in the data. 35 We thank Strahil Lepoev at the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation for providing estimates estimated user cost elasticity is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero but not di¤erent from -1 in all columns, which is similar to …ndings in Bond and Xing (2013) . Interestingly, results in column (5) suggest that total …xed assets in HMT have also signi…cantly decreased following the 2008 reform. This e¤ect becomes insigni…cant, however, when including …rm-level sales as an additional control. While the theory predicts no clear e¤ect of taxes on total sales, a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences regression suggests that total sales in HMT has also decreased signi…cantly following the 2008 reform, while there is no signi…cant decrease in sales to the tax reform in …rms of all other ownership types. The signi…cant decrease in investment as well as total sales in HMTs supports the view that many Chinese investors engage in "round-tripping" investment by channelling capital to Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan …rst. Investment by the HMT …rms into Mainland China is then disguised as foreign capital for local investment to take advantage of the preferential tax treatments only available to foreign investors. 36 Since the 2008 reform removed the preferential tax rate for foreign investors one would expect that "round tripping"investment and pro…t shifting becomes less attractive.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of the 2006 tax base reform and the 2008 tax rate reform in China on di¤erent types of companies, with a focus on the comparison between private and state-owned companies. We …nd that the impact of the tax changes on private …rms and COEs is consistent with standard models of pro…t maximization and wage bargaining. This also applies to foreign inward investment from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, where the impact on investment we observe is consistent with the idea that Chinese investors use HMT companies to bene…t from tax advantages for inward foreign investment. The impact on SOEs is di¤erent. We do not observe a signi…cant increase in wages after the increase in the deduction ceiling in 2006 and the reduction in the corporate tax rate has no signi…cant e¤ect on the amount of debt …nancing. As far as SOEs are concerned our results are broadly consistent with the view put forward by Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) , according to which state owned companies do not perceive taxes as costs and therefore have the advantage that their decisions are not distorted by taxes. Of course, the …nding that SOEs do not respond to tax reforms in the same way as private of the user cost of capital in China. The calculation assumes an in ‡ation rate of 2.5%, a real interest rate of 5%, and an economic depreciation rate of plant and machinery at 0.175. The present value of capital allowance is calculated at a rate of 10% on a straight-line basis for plant and machinery.
36 Xiao (2004) provides an in-depth discussion on the scale of round-tripping investment between Hong Kong and mainland China. …rms does not mean that they do perceive taxes as a substitute for pro…t distributions; their decisions may be driven by entirely di¤erent considerations and more research is needed to establish how they react to changes in taxes and other aspects of their economic environment. At the same time our results suggest that COEs, which are also …rms in a form of public ownership, do not behave as suggested by Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) . This may simply re ‡ect that their owners -typically local governments -receive none or very little of the tax revenue generated by these …rms. (1)) and in high-skill …rms (column (2), respectively. Column (3) and (4) show the estimated wage responses in …rms with and without a trade union, respectively. The dependent variable in all speci…cations is the logarithm of annual average company wage. The independent variable of interest is the three interaction terms between the ownership type and the post-2006 reform dummies. All speci…cations include a full set of …rm and year …xed e¤ects, and additional control variables of log sales, employment, sales growth rate, log …xed assets, and sector-speci…c time trends. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by …rm. *, **, *** indicates signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Notes: This table shows the estimated e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on debt ratio based on equation (13), where standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by …rm. The dependent variable in all speci…cations is the debt ratio de…ned as …rm-level debt over total asset. The independent variable of interest is the three interaction terms between the ownership type and the post-2008 reform dummies. All speci…cations include a full set of …rm and year …xed e¤ects. Speci…cation (1) includes no additional control variables. Speci…cation (2) controls for …rm size measured by log of sales. Speci…cation (3) adds the pro…tability ratio to measure the availability of internal cash ‡ow, and speci…cation (4) adds the sales growth rate to proxy future demand of …nancing. Speci…cation (5) further controls for di¤erential technology change at the industry level by including a full set of industry-speci…c time trend. Column (6) checks the robustness of the …ndings in column (5) to any potential anticipation e¤ects by removing observations in 2007 when the legislation change was announced. Column (7) includes lagged debt ratio to control for any persistence in the dependent variable while speci…cation (8) uses a smaller sample with no companies switching ownership types. *, **, *** indicates signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Notes: This table shows the estimated e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on investment based on equation (13), where standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by …rm. The dependent variable in all speci…cations is the logarithm of total …xed asset. The independent variable of interest is the three interaction terms between the ownership type and the post-2008 reform dummies. All speci…cations include a full set of …rm and year …xed e¤ects. Column (1) includes no additional control variables. Column (2) controls for …rm size measured by log of sales. Column (3) adds the pro…tability ratio to measure the availability of internal cash ‡ow, and column (4) further adds the sales growth rate to proxy future demand of …nancing. Column (5) further controls for di¤erential technology change at the industry level by including a full set of industry-speci…c time trend. Column (6) checks the robustness of the …ndings in column (5) to any potential anticipation e¤ects by removing observations in 2007 when the legislation change was announced. Column (7) includes lagged debt ratio to control for any persistence in the dependent variable while speci…cation (8) uses a smaller sample with no companies changed their ownership types. *, **, *** indicates signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. (2)) and in the dataset used for analyzing the e¤ect of the 2008 rate reform (columns (3)- (4)). The number of unique …rms decreases slightly when excluding …rms that changed their ownership types around the time period of each reform, respectively.
